Public announcement logic is an extension of multi-agent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after any announcement: ♦ϕ expresses that there is a truthful announcement ψ after which ϕ is true. This logic gives a perspective on Fitch's knowability issues: for which formulas ϕ does it hold that ϕ → ♦Kϕ? We give various semantic results, and we show completeness for a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic. There is a natural generalization to a logic for arbitrary events.
Introduction
One motivation to formalize the dynamics of knowledge is to characterize how truth or knowledge conditions can be realized by new information. From that perspective, it seems unfortunate that in public announcement logic [23, 13, 31] a true formula may become false because it is announced. The prime example is the Moore-sentence 'atom p is true and you do not know that', formalized by p ∧ ¬Kp [20, 15] , but there are many other examples [29] . After the Moore-sentence is announced, you know that p is true, so p ∧ ¬Kp is now false. This is formalized as p ∧ ¬Kp Kp, and p ∧ ¬Kp ¬(p ∧ ¬Kp), respectively. The part ' p ∧ ¬Kp ' is a diamond-style dynamic operator representing the announcement. Therefore, the way to make something known may not necessarily be to announce it. Is there a different way to get to know something?
The realization of knowledge (or truth) by new information can be seen as a specific form of what is called 'knowability' in philosophy. In [10] Fitch addresses the problematic question whether what is true can become known. It is considered problematic (paradoxical even) that the existence of unknown truths is inconsistent with the requirement that all truths are knowable. Again, the Moore-sentence p ∧ ¬Kp provides the prime example: it cannot become known, because K(p ∧ ¬Kp) entails an inconsistency under the standard interpretation of knowledge. For an overview of the literature on Fitch's paradox, see [7] , we will later discuss some of that in detail, mainly Tennant's proposal on cartesian formulas [25] . The suggestion to interpret 'knowable' as 'known after an announcement' was made by van Benthem in [26] .
Of course, some things can become known. For example, true facts p can always become known by announcing them, formalized as p → p Kp ('if the atom p is true, then after announcing p, p is known')-the above-mentioned paradox involves announcement of epistemic information. One has to be careful with what one wishes for: some things can become known that were not true in the first place. Consider factual knowledge again: after announcing a fact, you also know that you know it. In other words 'knowledge of p' is knowable in the sense that there is an announcement that makes it true: we now have that p KKp. But Kp was not true before that announcement, so this formula is not a knowable truth, except in the trivial sense when it was already true before the announcement.
Consider an extension of public announcement logic wherein we can express what becomes true, whether known or not, without explicit reference to announcements realizing that. Let us work our way upwards from a concrete announcement. When p is true, it becomes known by announcing it. Formally, in public announcement logic p Kp which stands for 'the announcement of p can be made and after that the agent knows p'. More abstractly this means that there is a announcement ψ, namely ψ = p, that makes the agent know p, slightly more formal:
there is a formula ψ such that ψ Kp
We introduce a dynamic modal operator that expresses that:
♦Kp
Obviously, the truth of this expression depends on the model: p has to be true. In case p is false, we can achieve ♦K¬p instead. The formula ♦(Kp ∨ K¬p) is valid. Actually, we were slightly imprecise when suggesting that ♦ means 'there is a ψ such that'. In fact a restriction on ψ to purely epistemic formulas is required in the semantics, for a technical reason. The resulting logic is called arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL, or in short, arbitrary announcement logic.
Unlike the introductory examples so far, we present the logic as a multi-agent logic, wherein all knowledge operators are labelled with the knowing agent in question. For example, we write the validity above as ♦(K a p ∨ K a ¬p), indicating that this concerns what agent a can get to know. There are both conceptual and technical reasons for this multi-agent perspective. (i) Various paradoxical situations involving knowledge-that we can in principle also address in arbitrary announcement logic-require more than one agent (such as the Hangman Paradox, also known as the Surprise Examination, for a dynamic epistemic analysis see [29] ). (ii) One technical reason is that: arbitrary announcement logic for more than one agent is strictly more expressive than public announcement logic, but that for a single agent it is equally expressive. (iii) We present interesting multi-agent formulations of knowability, such as knowledge transfer between agents and how to make distributive knowledge common knowledge.
Overview of contents In Section 2 we define the logical language L apal and its semantics. This section also contains some technical tools repeatedly used in later sections. Section 3 shows various semantic results, including a 'knowable' fragment of the language (we do not fully characterize the knowable formulas), and an expressivity result: indeed our logic can express more than the public announcement logic upon which it is based. In Section 4 we provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of arbitrary announcement logic. Section 5 discusses the generalization to a logic for arbitrary events.
Syntax and semantics
Both for the language and the structures we assume as background parameters a finite set of agents A and a countably infinite set of atoms P .
Syntactic notions
Definition 1 (Language) The language L apal of arbitrary public announcement logic is inductively defined as
where a ∈ A and p ∈ P . Additionally, L pal is the language without inductive construct ϕ, L el the language without as well [ϕ]ϕ, and L pl the language without as well K a ϕ. The language with only as modal operator is L .
The languages L pal , L el , and L pl are those of public announcement logic, epistemic logic, and propositional logic, respectively. A formula in L el is also called an epistemic formula and a formula in L pl is also called a propositional formula or a boolean. For K a ϕ, read 'agent a knows that ϕ'. For [ϕ]ψ, read '(if ϕ is true, then) after announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)'. (Announcements are supposed to be public and truthful, and this is common knowledge among the agents.) For ψ, read 'after every announcement, ψ is true'. Other propositional and epistemic connectives are defined by usual abbreviations. The dual of K a is K a , the dual of [ϕ] is ϕ , and the dual of is ♦. For K a ϕ, read 'agent a considers it possible that ϕ', for ϕ ψ, read '(ϕ is true and) after announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)' and for ♦ψ, read 'there is an announcement after which ψ (is true).' Write P ϕ for the set of atoms occurring in the formula ϕ (and similarly for necessity and possibility forms, below). Given some
Necessity and possibility forms A necessity form (see [14] ) contains a unique occurrence of a special symbol ♯. If ψ is such a necessity form (we write boldface Greek letters for arbitrary necessity forms) and ϕ ∈ L apal , then ψ(ϕ) is obtained from ψ by substituting ϕ for ♯ in ψ. Necessity forms are used to formulate the axiomatization of the logic, in Section 4, and in the proofs of several semantic results, in Section 3.
Definition 2 (Necessity forms) Let ϕ ∈ L apal . Then:
• ♯ is a necessity form,
• if ψ is a necessity form then (ϕ → ψ) is a nec. form,
• if ψ is a necessity form then [ϕ]ψ is a nec. form,
• if ψ is a necessity form then K a ψ is a nec. form.
We also use the dual notion of possibility form. It can be defined by the dual clauses to a necessity form: ♯ is a possibility form, and if ϕ ∈ L apal and ψ is a possibility form then ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ψ, andK a ψ are possibility forms. To distinguish necessity forms from possibility forms we use different bracketing: write ψ{ϕ} for the possibility form with a unique occurrence of ϕ. For each necessity form ψ(♯) there is a possibility form ψ ′ {♯} such that for all ϕ, ¬ψ(ϕ) is logically equivalent to ¬ψ ′ {¬ϕ}.
Structural notions
Definition 3 (Structures) An epistemic model M = (S, ∼, V ) consists of a domain S of (factual) states (or 'worlds'), accessibility ∼ : A → P(S×S), where each ∼ (a) is an equivalence relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S). For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an epistemic state (also known as a pointed Kripke model). An epistemic frame S is a pair (S, ∼). For a model we also write (S, V ) and for a pointed model also (S, V, s).
For ∼ (a) we write ∼ a , and for V (p) we write V p ; accessibility ∼ can be seen as a set of equivalence relations ∼ a , and V as a set of valuations V p . Given two states s, s ′ in the domain, s ∼ a s ′ means that s is indistinguishable from s ′ for agent a on the basis of its knowledge. We adopt the standard rules for omission of parentheses in formulas, and we also delete them in representations of structures such as (M, s) whenever convenient and unambiguous. Given a domain S of a model M , instead of s ∈ S we also write s ∈ M .
Bisimulation Bisimulation is a well-known notion of structural similarity [6] that we will frequently use in examples and proofs, e.g. to achieve our expressivity results.
Definition 4 (Bisimulation) Let two models M = (S, ∼, V ) and M ′ = (S ′ , ∼ ′ , V ′ ) be given. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is a bisimulation between M and M ′ iff for all s ∈ S and s ′ ∈ S ′ with (s, s ′ ) ∈ R:
forth for all a ∈ A and all t ∈ S: if s ∼ a t, then there is a t ′ ∈ S ′ such that s ′ ∼ ′ a t ′ and (t, t ′ ) ∈ R; back for all a ∈ A and all t ′ ∈ S ′ : if s ′ ∼ ′ a t ′ , then there is a t ∈ S such that s ∼ a t and (t, t ′ ) ∈ R.
We write (M, s) ↔ (M ′ , s ′ ), iff there is a bisimulation between M and M ′ linking s and s ′ , and we then call (M, s) and (M ′ , s ′ ) bisimilar. The maximal bisimulation R max between M and itself is an equivalence relation, and the result of identifying all R max bisimilar worlds is a minimal model (also known as bisimulation contraction, or strongly extensional model) [1] . The construction preserves equivalence relations: if M is an epistemic model, its minimal model is also an epistemic model.
Semantics
Definition 5 (Semantics) Assume an epistemic model M = (S, ∼, V ). The interpretation of ϕ ∈ L apal is defined by induction. Note the restriction to epistemic formulas in the clause for ϕ.
The dynamic modal operator [ϕ] is interpreted as an epistemic state transformer. Announcements are assumed to be truthful and public, and this is commonly known to all agents. Therefore, the model M |ϕ is the model M restricted to all the states where ϕ is true, including access between states. Similarly, the dynamic model operator is interpreted as an epistemic state transformer. Note that in the definiendum of ϕ the announcements ψ in [ψ]ϕ are restricted to purely epistemic formulas L el . This is motivated in depth, below. For the semantics of the dual operators, we have that M, s |= ♦ψ iff there is a ϕ ∈ L el such that M, s |= ϕ ψ. In other words, M, s |= ϕ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M |ϕ, s |= ψ. The set of validities in our logic is called APAL. Formally this is relative to given sets of agents and atoms, but we will also use APAL more informally to refer to arbitrary public announcement logic. Similarly for PL (propositional logic), EL (epistemic logic, a.k.a. S5 n where |A| = n), and PAL (public announcement logic).
Bisimilar states satisfy the same epistemic formulas. This extends to APAL. The reader may easily verify that if the epistemic states (M, s) and (M ′ , s ′ ) are bisimilar, then for all
This example also nicely illustrates the order in which arbitrary objects come to light. The meaning of |= ♦ϕ is for all (M, s) there is an epistemic ψ such that M, s |= ψ ϕ (i).
This is really different from
there is an epistemic ψ such that for all (M, s), M, s |= ψ ϕ (ii), which might on first sight be appealing to the reader, when extrapolating from the incorrect reading of |= ♦ϕ as 'there is an epistemic ψ such that |= ψ ϕ'. For example, there is no epistemic formula ψ such that ψ (K a p ∨ K a ¬p) is valid. (Suppose there were. Then ψ would be valid; so an announcement of ψ would not be informative. Then, ψ (K a p ∨ K a ¬p) would be equivalent to K a p ∨ K a ¬p. But in any model where it is not known whether p the latter is false, so it is not valid. Contradiction.) In other words, (i) may be true, even when (ii) is false.
Motivation for the semantics of
We now compare the given semantics for ϕ to two infelicitous alternatives, thus hoping to motivate our choice. The three options are (infelicitous alternatives are *-ed):
The 'intuitive' version for the semantics of ϕ more properly corresponds to its intended meaning 'ϕ is true after arbitrary announcements'. This would be a circular definition, as ϕ is itself one such announcement. It is not clear whether this is well-defined, but a restriction to announcements that are epistemic sentences seems at least reasonable in a context of knowledge and belief change. The 'structural' version for the semantics of ϕ is more in accordance with one of Fine's proposals for quantification over propositional variables in modal logic [9] ; his work strongly inspired our approach. This structural version is undesirable for our purposes, as it does not preserve bisimilarity of structures: two bisimilar states can now be separated because they may be in different subdomains. In dynamic epistemic logics it is considered preferable that action execution preserves bisimilarity; this is because bisimilarity implies logical equivalence, and we tend to think of such actions as changing the theories describing those structures, just as in belief revision. For an example, consider the following epistemic state (M, 1) -it consists of two states 1 and 1 where p is true and two states 0 and 0 where p is false; linking two states means that they are indistinguishable for the agent labeling the link; and the underlined state is the actual state. We
On the other hand, for the -semantics as defined, M, 1 |= ♦(K a p∧¬K b K a p), which can be easily seen as that formula is also false in the two-state structure (M ′ , 1 ′ ) depicted as
We make two further observations concerning our preferred semantics ' ϕ (is true) iff [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ L el '. First, given that truth is relative to a model, this semantics for amounts to ' ϕ is true in (M, s) iff ϕ is true in all epistemistically definable submodels of M .' Second, note that public announcement logic is equally expressive as multiagent epistemic logic [23] , so ' ϕ (is true) iff [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ L el ' corresponds to ' ϕ (is true) iff [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ L pal .' So in fact we can replace boxes by announcements of any formula except those containing boxes-which comes fairly close to the intuitive interpretation again.
A theoretically quite justifiable and felicitous version of the 'structural' semantics for above would equate truth of ϕ with truth for all subsets of the minimal model (see page 4) of a model M , that contain the actual state s (in other words, a subset must not separate states that are in the maximal bisimulation relation on M ). We did not explore this alternative semantics for in depth. For a given model there may be more such subsets than are epistemically definable, e.g., there may be uncountably many such subsets, whereas the epistemically definable subsets are countable.
3 Semantic results
Validities

Validities only involving : S4
The following validities demonstrate the 'S4'-character of . These validities do not, as usual, straightforwardly translate to frame properties, because we interpret as an epistemic state transformer and not by way of an accessibility relation. 1 It is also unclear if the set of validities only involving (i.e., L ∩ APAL) satisfies uniform substitution (replacing propositional variables by arbitrary formulas is validity preserving). See further research in Section 6.
1 It is possible to associate an accessibility relation to . Given an model M , consider the union of its epistemically definable submodels, where we label copies of states (in order to distinguish them from their original) with an epistemic formula ψ representing (the class of formulas logically equivalent to ψ namely) [[ψ] ]M . If M |ϕ|ψ = M |χ, now add pair (sϕ, sχ) to the accessibility relation R ψ for announcement operator [ψ] . Let R = S ψ∈L el R ψ . If we do this just for announcements that correspond to sequences of announcements of a single epistemic formula ψ, the result is known as the forest for (M, s) and ψ [28] . M, s |= ϕ.
3. Let M and s ∈ M be arbitrary. Assume M, s |= ♦♦¬ϕ. Then there are epistemic χ and χ ′ such that M, s |= χ χ ′ ¬ϕ. Using the validity (for arbitrary formulas) As ψ is arbitrary, also M, s |= ϕ.
Validities only involving : MK and CR
Also valid are |= ♦ϕ → ♦ ϕ (McKinsey -MK) and |= ♦ ϕ → ♦ϕ (Church-Rosser -CR). Axiom CR corresponds to the well-known frame property of confluence: ∀xyz(Rxy ∧ Rxz → ∃w(Ryw ∧ Rzw)). In our terms, this can be formulated as follows. Given two distinct (and true) announcements ϕ, ψ in some epistemic state (M, s), then there are subsequent Lemma 8 Let ϕ ∈ L apal . Consider the set P ϕ of atoms occurring in ϕ. Let M be a model where all states correspond on the valuation of P ϕ . Then M |= ϕ or M |= ¬ϕ, i.e., either ϕ or its negation is a model validity.
Proof Let ϕ(ψ/p) be the substitution of ψ for all occurrences of p in formula ϕ. (Note the difference with the notation for necessity and possibility forms on page 3.) If p is true on
The result of successively substituting ⊤ or ⊥ for all atoms in ϕ in that way is the formula ϕ ∅ . Clearly, M |= ϕ ↔ ϕ ∅ . As ϕ ∅ does not contain atomic propositions, and given that |= K a ⊤ ↔ ⊤, |= K a ⊥ ↔ ⊥, |= ⊤ ↔ ⊤, and
The characteristic formula δ ϕ s of the restriction of the valuation in a state s to the finite set P ϕ of atoms occurring in ϕ, is defined as follows: We now proceed with matters towards proving Church-Rosser. We extend the substitution notation already in use (ϕ(ψ/p) is the substitution of ψ for all occurrences of p in formula ϕ) to simultaneous substitution for infinite sequences ϕ(ψ 0 /p 0 , ψ 1 /p 1 , . . . ).
Lemma 11 Let Q = {q n | n ∈ N} ⊆ P be an infinite set of atoms, let θ ∈ L el be an epistemic formula such that P θ ∩ Q = ∅, and let ϕ ∈ L apal with P ϕ ∩ Q = ∅. Given a frame S and a valuation V on S, there exists a valuation V ′ on S such that:
As a consequence of clause (2) of Lemma 11, we have that the epistemically definable subsets of (S, V ) are the same as those of (S, V ′ ). We now use the lemma to show that:
Proposition 12 If M, s |= ♦ψ and p ∈ P ψ , then there exists a model M ′ only differing from M in the valuation of atoms not occurring in ψ such that M ′ , s |= p ψ.
Proof Let M = (S, V ) = (S, ∼, V ). We use first the above Lemma 11, namely for Q := P \ P ψ , q 0 := p, θ = ⊤, and ϕ := ♦ψ,
Further, we can assume that p ∈ P θ : the valuation of p has been set to ⊤ in V ′ , therefore if there had been occurrences of p in θ they could have been replaced by ⊤. We now apply Lemma 11 again, with Q := P \ (P θ ∪ P ψ ), q 0 := p, ϕ := θ ψ, and θ as given,
Proposition 12 can be generalized to:
Proof The proof is straightforward and by induction on the complexity of possibility forms. The basic case is the proof of Proposition 12. The case 'conjunction' starts with M, s |= χ∧♦ψ and p ∈ P χ ∪ P ψ . Etc.
We will use Proposition 13 below, to prove the soundness of a derivation rule in the axiomatization of arbitrary announcement logic. For now, we only need Proposition 13 to show the CR property.
Proposition 14 (CR is valid) |= ♦ ϕ → ♦ϕ
Proof Suppose that CR fails. Then there exist M, s and ϕ such that M, s |= ♦ ϕ ∧ ♦ ¬ϕ. By applying Proposition 13 twice (namely for the possibility form 'conjunction', once for the left conjunct and once for the right conjunct) there are p, q ∈ P ϕ and a model M ′ that is like M except for the valuation of p and q, such that M ′ , s |= p ϕ ∧ q ¬ϕ. We therefore also have M ′ , s |= p [q]ϕ ∧ q [p]¬ϕ from which follows M ′ , s |= p q ϕ ∧ q p ¬ϕ, and therefore, as p and q are boolean (sequential announcement of booleans corresponds to the announcement of their conjunction), M ′ , s |= p ∧ q (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), which is a contradiction. 
there is a χ such thatK a χ ¬ϕ.
The relation between knowledge and arbitrary announcement
Proof Suppose M, s |= K a ϕ and M, s |= ψ. Assume t ∈ M |ψ with s ∼ a t. We have to prove that M |ψ, t |= ϕ. Because state t is also in M , from the assumption M, s |= K a ϕ and (in M ) s ∼ a t follows M, t |= ϕ. As ψ is true in t, M |ψ, t |= ϕ. Figure 2 . Although K a ϕ → K a ϕ is valid, the other direction K a ϕ → K a ϕ is not valid. It is instructive to give a counterexample.
Proposition 15 is visualized in
Example 16 ( K a ϕ → K a ϕ is not valid) Consider the model:
is only true in the model restriction {0, 1} that excludes the actual state 0. Therefore, K a ϕ → K a ϕ is invalid. In simple words, it may unfortunately happen that we jump to a state where a model restriction is possible that excludes the actual state. Therefore, things that are true at that state may be impossible to realize by a reversal of that process.
Validities relating booleans and arbitrary announcements
The following Proposition 17 will be helpful to show that in the single-agent case every formula is equivalent to an epistemic L el -formula, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.
Proof In the proof, we use the dual (diamond) versions of all propositions.
1. |= ♦ϕ ↔ ϕ This is valid because ψ ϕ ↔ ϕ is valid in PAL, for any ψ and boolean ϕ.
2. |= ♦K a ϕ ↔ ϕ Right-to-left holds because ϕ → ϕ K a ϕ is valid in PAL for booleans. The other way round, |= ♦K a ϕ → ϕ because ♦K a ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid in PAL, and ♦ϕ ↔ ϕ is valid in PAL as we have seen above (ϕ being boolean).
3. |= ♦K a ϕ ↔K a ϕ Right-to-left holds follows from the dual form of the validity ϕ → ϕ (Proposition 7). Left-to-right holds because ψ K a ϕ →K a ϕ is valid in PAL for booleans ϕ.
Left-to-right: First, ♦ distributes over ∧, and second, |= ♦ϕ ↔ ϕ as we have established above. From right-to-left: ϕ ∧ ♦ψ is equivalent to (apply case 1) ϕ ∧ ♦ψ. From the semantics of now directly follows ♦(ϕ ∧ ψ).
We show this case for n = 1.
Left-to-right: Directly in the semantics. Let M, s be arbitrary and suppose M, s |=
Let t be such that s ∼ a t and M |ψ, t |= ϕ 1 . As M |ψ, s |= K a ϕ 0 , and s ∼ a t, also M |ψ, t |= ϕ 0 . Therefore M |ψ, t |= ϕ 0 ∧ ϕ 1 , and therefore M |ψ, s |=K a (ϕ 0 ∧ ϕ 1 ). So M |ψ, s |= ϕ 0 ∧K a (ϕ 0 ∧ϕ 1 ), and as ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 are booleans also M, s |= ϕ 0 ∧K a (ϕ 0 ∧ϕ 1 ). 2
Right-to-left: For the other direction, suppose M, s |= ϕ 0 ∧K a (ϕ 0 ∧ ϕ 1 ). Consider the model M |ϕ 0 . Because M, s |=K a (ϕ 0 ∧ϕ 1 ), and ϕ 1 is boolean, there must be a t ∈ M |ϕ 0 such that
Expressivity
If there is a single agent only, arbitrary announcement logic reduces to epistemic logic. But for more than one agent, it is strictly more expressive than public announcement logic. We remind the reader that, in the absence of common knowledge, public announcement logic is equally expressive as epistemic logic. First, we consider the single-agent case. Let A = {a}. We obtain the result by applying Proposition 17. We need some additional terminology as well. A formula is in normal form when it is a conjunction of disjunctions of the form ϕ ∨K a ϕ 0 ∨ K a ϕ 1 ∨ . . . ∨ K a ϕ n , where ϕ, ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n are all formulas in propositional logic. Every formula in single-agent S5 is equivalent to a formula in normal form [18] . A normal form may not exist for a multi-agent formula, e.g., it does not exist for K a K b p. This explains why the result below does not carry over to the multi-agent case.
Proposition 18
Single agent arbitrary announcement logic is equally expressive as epistemic logic.
Proof We prove by induction on the number of occurrences of , that every formula in single-agent arbitrary announcement logic is equivalent to a formula in epistemic logic. Put the epistemic formula in the scope of an innermost in normal form. First, we distribute over the conjunction (Proposition 7.1). We now get formulas of the form (ϕ ∨K a ϕ 0 ∨ K a ϕ 1 ∨· · ·∨K a ϕ n ). These are reduced by application of Propositions 17.4 and 17.5 to formulas
Proposition 19 Arbitrary announcement logic is strictly more expressive than public announcement logic.
Proof The proof follows an abstract argument. Suppose the logics are equally expressive, in other words, that there is some reduction rule for arbitrary announcement such that ϕ can be reduced to an expression without . Given the reduction of PAL to EL, this entails that every arbitrary announcement formula should be equivalent to an epistemic logical formula. Now the crucial observation is that this epistemic formula only contains a finite number of atomic propositions. We then construct models that cannot be distinguished in the restricted language, but can be distinguished in a language with more atoms.
So it remains to give a specific formula and a specific pair of models. Note that the formula must involve more than one agent, as single-agent arbitrary announcement logic is reducible to epistemic logic (see Proposition 18) .
Consider the formula ♦(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p). Assume, towards a contradiction, that it is equivalent to an epistemic logical formula ψ. W.l.o.g. we may assume that ψ only contains the atom p. 3 We now construct two different epistemic states (M, s) and (M ′ , s ′ ) involving a new atom q such that ♦(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p) is true in the first but false in the second. We also take care that the two models are bisimilar with respect to the language without q. Therefore, the supposed reduction is either true in both models or false in both models. Contradiction. Therefore, no such reduction exists.
The required models are as follows. Epistemic state (M, 1) consists of the well-known model M where a cannot distinguish between states where p is true and false, but b can (but knows that a cannot, etc.), i.e., domain {0, 1} with universal access for a and identity access for b, where p is only true at 1, and 1 is the actual state. Visualized as: We now have that (M, 1) is bisimilar to (M ′ , 10) with regard to the epistemic language for atom p and agents a, b. Therefore M, 1 |= ψ iff M ′ , 10 |= ψ. On the other hand (M, 1) is not bisimilar to (M ′ , 10) with regard to the epistemic language for atoms p, q and agents a, b. This is evidenced by the fact that M,
: the announcement p ∨ q restricts the domain to the three states where it is true, and
As an aside, because it departs from our assumption that all accessibility relations are equivalence relations, we have yet another result concerning expressive power. Consider the more general multi-agent models M = (S, R, V ) for accessibility functions R : A → P(S × S). Unlike the corresponding relations ∼ a in epistemic models, the relations R a are not necessarily equivalence relations. We now interpret the same language on those structures, with the obvious (only) difference that M, s |= K a ϕ iff for all t ∈ S : R a (s, t) implies M, t |= ϕ. Many results still carry over to the more general logic, but the expressivity results are now different.
Proposition 20
With respect to the class of multi-agent models for (a single) accessibility relation R a , single-agent arbitrary announcement logic is strictly more expressive than public announcement logic.
Proof Along the same argument as in Proposition 19, on the assumption that a given formula ϕ is logically equivalent to a -free formula ψ not containing some fresh atom q we present two models that are bisimilar with respect to the atoms in ψ and that therefore cannot be distinguished by ψ, but that have a different valuation for ϕ. From the contradiction follows strictly larger expressivity.
Consider the formula ♦(K a p ∧ ¬K a K a p) and assume that it is equivalent to an epistemic ψ only containing atom p; and consider models M and M ′ as follows:
Multi-agent state (M, 1) consists of the familiar model M where a cannot distinguish between states 1 and 0 where p is true and false, respectively, and where 1 is the actual state. We now explicitly visualize all pairs in the accessibility relation and get:
Multi-agent state (M ′ , 10) consists of two copies of M , namely a bottom one where a new fact q is false and a top one where q is true. The actual state is 10. Accessibility relations are as shown-note that there is no reflexive access on any world. We now have that (M, 1) is bisimilar to (M ′ , 10) with regard to the epistemic language for atom p and agent a, but that (M, 1) is not bisimilar to (M ′ , 10) with regard to the epistemic language for atoms p, q and agent a.
Compactness and model checking
Compactness The counterexample used in the proof of Proposition 19 can be adjusted to show that APAL is not compact.
Proposition 21
Arbitrary announcement logic is not compact.
Proof Take the following infinite set of formulas:
By the semantics of , this set is obviously not satisfiable. But we will show that any of its finite subsets is satisfiable. This contradicts compactness. Let
be any such finite subset, and let q be an atomic sentence that is distinct from p and does not occur in any of the sentences θ i (0 ≤ i ≤ n). Take now the epistemic state (M ′ , 10) as in the proof of Proposition 19. As shown above, we have
On the other hand, for the epistemic state (M, 1) as in the above proof, we have shown above that we have M,
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n; but q doesn't occur in any of these formulas, so their truth-values must be the same at (M ′ , 10) and (M, 1) (since as shown above, the two epistemic states are bisimilar w.r.t. the language without q). Thus, we have
Putting these together, we see that our finite set of formulas is satisfied at the state (M ′ , 10).
Model checking We preferred to keep some technical results on model checking out of the paper. The model checking problem for the logic APAL (to determine the extension of a given formula in a given model) is PSPACE-complete (Work in progress by Balbiani et al.) . Let us briefly sketch why the model checking problem for APAL is decidable. This result is not trivial, because of the implicit quantification over all atoms in the -operator. Consider a finite model with a recursive valuation map (from the infinite set of atomic sentences to the powerset of the model). It is well-known that determining the largest bisimulation on such a model is a decidable problem, and so is finding all subsets of the model that are closed under the largest bisimulation. Given such a model and a formula, we can then then replace all occurrences of ϕ in that formula by a finite conjunction of announcement sentences [θ]ϕ, where the denotation of the announced formulas θ ranges over all the subsets that are closed under the largest bisimulation of the model. (We use here the known fact that a subset of a finite model is definable in basic modal/epistemic logic if and only if it is closed under the largest bisimulation.) To determine the truth of the resulting formula one can then use a model-checking algorithm for public announcement logic.
Decidability Finally, it is relevant to observe that the related issue of the decidability of the logic has been resolved by French in an as yet unpublished manuscript [11] : arbitrary announcement logic is undecidable. A logic is decidable iff there is a terminating procedure to determine whether a given formula is satisfiable. French proved via a tiling argument (and an embedding) that it is co-RE complete to determine whether a given formula can be satisfied in some model.
Knowability and other semantic or syntactic fragments
A suitable direction of research is the syntactic or semantic characterization of interesting fragments of the logic. In this section we define positive, preserved, successful, and knowable formulas, and investigate their relation. (See Figure 1 for an overview of definitions.) The positive formulas intuitively correspond to formulas that do not express ignorance; in epistemic logical (L el ) terms: in which negations do not precede K a operators. We consider a generalization of that notion to L apal . The fragment of the positive formulas is inductively defined as
Note that the truth of the announcement is a condition of its execution, which, when seen as a disjunction, explains the negation in [¬ϕ] . Unfortunately, the negation in [¬ϕ]ϕ makes 'positive' somewhat of a misnomer. The preserved formulas preserve truth under arbitrary (epistemically definable) model restriction, also known as relativization. They are (semantically) defined as those ϕ for which |= ϕ → ϕ. 5 There is no corresponding semantic principle in public announcement logic that expresses truth preservation.
We now prove that positive formulas are preserved. Restricted to epistemic logic without common knowledge, this was observed by van Benthem in [27] . In [29] van Ditmarsch and Kooi extended van Benthem's result, with an additional clause [¬ϕ]ϕ. (And also, unlike here, an additional clause C B ϕ for subgroup common knowledge operators, where B ⊆ A.) Surprisingly, we can further extend the notion of 'positive' to arbitrary announcement logic, by adding a clause ϕ: in the case ϕ of the inductive proof below to show truth preservation, assuming the opposite easily leads to a contradiction. It is sufficient, because it then also holds for all epistemically definable submodels M ′ . We show (i) by proving an even slightly stronger proposition, namely:
This has the advantage of loading the induction hypothesis. Loading is needed for the case [¬ϕ]ψ of the proof, that is by induction on the formula. We assume most cases to be wellknown, except for the case [¬ϕ]ψ, similarly shown in [29] , and ϕ, which is new.
Case Van Benthem [27] also shows that preserved formulas are (logically equivalent to) positive. This is not known for the extension of these notions to public announcement logic in [29] , nor for arbitrary announcement logic. An answer to this question seems hard.
Another semantic notion is that of success. Successful formulas are believed after their announcement, or, in other words, after 'revision' with that formula. This corresponds to the postulate of 'success' in AGM belief revision. Formally, ϕ is a successful formula iff [ϕ]ϕ is valid (see [29] , elaborating an original but slightly different proposal in [12] ). The validity of [ϕ]ϕ is equivalent to the validity of ϕ → [ϕ]K a ϕ: "if ϕ is true, then after announcing ϕ, ϕ is believed." (see [29] ). This validity describes in a dynamic epistemic setting the postulate of success for belief expansion: "if ϕ is true, then after expansion with ϕ, ϕ should be believed." Proposition 23 Preserved formulas are successful.
Corollary 24 Positive formulas are successful.
Fitch observed that not all unknown truths can become known [10, 7] , such as the well-known p ∧ ¬Kp. Instead of calling this a paradox (which Fitch did not do either!), we prefer to call it a fact, and the question then is what unknown truths can become known. For a single agent a we can define the knowable formulas as those for which |= ϕ → ♦K a ϕ, and the most obvious multi-agent version defines the knowable formulas as those for which, for all agents a ∈ A, |= ϕ → ♦K a ϕ. (See a paragraph below for some additional multi-agent versions of knowability.) We can now observe that:
Proposition 25 Positive, preserved, and successful formulas are all knowable.
Proof Similar to the proof of Prop. 23 
The syntactic characterization of knowable formulas remains an open question-but we would like to emphasize that, given a choice of interpretation for as in our logic, this has become a purely technical question. We think that this is a proper way to address knowability issues. Some knowable formulas are not positive, for example ¬K a p: if true, announce ⊤, and K a ¬K a p (still!) holds. Therefore |= ¬K a p → ♦K a ¬K a p.
Other approaches The excellent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Fitch's Paradox [7] gives an overview of semantic and syntactic restrictions intended to avoid its paradoxical character.
It is relevant to mention Tennant's cartesian formulas: a formula ϕ is cartesian iff Kϕ is not provably inconsistent [25] . A semantic correspondent of that, more in line with semantic features of formulas that we distinguished above, would be to define ϕ as cartesian iff Kϕ is satisfiable, or, in other terms, iff |= ¬Kϕ. Van Benthem observed that cartesian formulas may not be knowable [26] . For example, the formula p ∧ ¬Kq is cartesian but not knowable:
Consider a model where the formula is satisfied in a state wherein p is true but q is false. Now announce p. This results in a state where p is now known but ¬Kq is of course still true. So, with introspection for knowledge and distribution of K over ∧ we have that K(p ∧ ¬Kq) is true. Therefore, the formula is cartesian.
On the other hand, we have that |= p ∧ ¬Kq, because in a model where the denotations of atoms p and q are the same, p ∧ ¬Kq is false in any model restriction. Therefore, the formula is not knowable (in our sense).
It seems reasonable that this formula should be knowable in some other sense. But it is unclear in what sense. For example, what if one characterizes the knowable formulas as those for which for all agents-returning to the multiagent situation-ϕ → ♦K a ϕ is merely satisfiable, and not necessarily valid? Unfortunately, every formula is knowable in that sense. If ϕ is valid, then K a ϕ is valid, and ϕ → Kϕ as well, so also ϕ → ♦K a ϕ, so a fortiori it is satisfiable. If ϕ is not valid, there must be an epistemic model M and a state s in that model where ϕ is false. But in that case we also have, trivially, that M, s |= ϕ → ♦K a ϕ. Therefore, ϕ → ♦K a ϕ is satisfiable. Therefore, ϕ → ♦K a ϕ is satisfiable for all ϕ.
Another (rather summary) syntactic characterization, within an intuitionistic setting, is that by Dummett in [8] .
Moss and Parikh's topologic [21, 22] has the same language combining the knowledge operator K with box , although for a single agent only. They interpret not in our temporal sense but in a spatial sense. With us, ♦ϕ means 'ϕ is true after a sequence of announcements', i.e., 'after some time'. Moss and Parikh suggest to interpret ♦ϕ as 'ϕ is true when taking some effort narrowing down the possibilities', i.e., 'closer'. How they relate K and in their semantics is different from our approach, because the structure on which they interpret their language is a topology of subsets of the domain of states. Most interestingly an open set in a topology is characterized by a 'knowability-like' formula: (See [21, p.98] ). An open set is a subset of the domain of the model M with a certain property relative to the topology defined on that domain.) They do not observe the relevance of their logic for knowability issues. Incidentally, Fitch leaves the question of how to interpret open in [10] , and explicitly says that it does not have to be interpreted temporally: "the element of time will be ignored in dealing with these various concepts [such as knowledge]" [10, p.135].
Multi-agent versions of knowability There are various multi-agent versions of knowability that can be explored. To name a few:
• ϕ → ♦C A ϕ: commonly knowable truths 
Axiomatization
The axiomatization APAL and its soundness
We now provide a complete axiomatization of L apal .
Definition 26
The axiomatization APAL is given in Table 2 . A formula is a theorem if it belongs to the least set of formulas containing all axioms and closed under the rules. If ϕ is a theorem, we write ⊢ ϕ.
Proposition 27 (Soundness) The axiomatization APAL is sound. We only pay attention to the axiom and the derivation rule involving .
1. ϕ → [ψ]ϕ, where ψ ∈ L el (arbitrary and specific announcement) all instantiations of propositional tautologies
where p ∈ P ψ ∪ P θ ∪ P ϕ deriving arbitrary announcement / R( ) Table 2 : The axiomatization APAL
The soundness of 'arbitrary and specific announcement' follows directly from the semantics of . The restriction to epistemic formulas is important. Without that restriction it is unclear if the axiom is sound. 
Example derivations
Example 28 We show that the validity p → p is also a theorem. In step 4 we use that the axiomatization for public announcement logic PAL satisfies the property of 'substitution of equivalents' (see [23, 24] , or [31] for details). In step 8 of the derivation we use that p → [q]♯ is a necessity form, and in step 9 of the derivation we use that p → ♯ is a necessity form. p] p is a theorem. This means that, regardless of the restriction in axiom ϕ → [ψ]ϕ (arbitrary and specific announcement) that ψ ∈ L el , there are already very basic theorems of the form [ψ]ϕ where ψ is not an epistemic formula. The restriction is therefore not 'per se' a reason to fear incompleteness of the logic.
Finally, we show that a derivation rule for necessitation of is derivable in APAL. The proof presents another, very short, example of a derivation. But as the reader might have expected this rule in the proof system, we present the result as a proposition and not as an example. In Proposition 7.4 on page 7 we proved the soundness of this principle.
Proposition 30
Necessitation of arbitrary announcement is derivable in APAL.
1, necessition of announcement; choose p ∈ P ϕ 3. ⊢ ϕ 2, deriving arbitrary announcement
Variants of the rule for deriving arbitrary announcement
We now prove completeness for the logic APAL. We do this indirectly, by way of an infinitary variant of the axiomatization APAL, that we can show to be complete with respect to the APAL semantics. We apply a technique suggested by Goldblatt [14] using the 'necessity forms' that were introduced in Definition 2 on page 3. Necessity forms are used in the formulation of two variants R 1 ( ) and R ω ( ), now to follow, of the rule R( ) ('deriving arbitrary announcement') from system APAL.
Definition 31
Axiomatization APAL ω is the variant of APAL with the infinitary rule R ω ( ) instead of R( ). Axiomatization APAL 1 is the variant of APAL with the different finitary rule R 1 ( ) instead of R( ).
Proposition 32 The rules R 1 ( ) and R ω ( ) are sound.
Proof The reader may easily verify that the rule R ω ( ) is sound, as this directly corresponds to the semantics for : a formula of the form ψ is valid, if [ϕ]ψ is valid for all epistemic ϕ. Now replace 'valid' by 'derivable', and observe that the argument can be generalized for other necessity forms than the basic necessity form.
The soundness of rule R 1 ( ) is shown exactly as the soundness of R( ): in the soundness proof of R( ) it was only essential that ϕ → [θ][p]ψ and ϕ → [θ] ψ were in necessity form.
Next, we show in Proposition 34 that every APAL theorem is a APAL 1 theorem, and vice versa. That proposition requires a lemma.
Lemma 33 Given a necessity form ϕ(♯), there are ψ, χ ∈ L apal such that for all θ ∈ L apal :
Proof Let ϕ(θ) be a theorem. Such an instance of a necessity form ϕ(♯) has the following shape: the formula θ is entirely on the right (or, if you wish, entirely on the inside); it is successively bound by, in arbitrary order and arbitrarily often, K a -operators, announcement operators [χ ′ ], and implicative forms χ ′′ → . . . . We can 'rearrange the order of these bindings', so to speak, to get the required form ψ → [χ]θ. This, of course, is still a necessity form. But a fairly simple one. For these rearrangements it does not matter whether the formula ϕ(θ) contains other logical connectives (or even operators!) that were not used as constructors for the necessity form: these remain bound as they already were. We are only shifting around epistemic operators, announcements, and implications that were used to construct the necessity form and other subformulas remain unchanged.
First we look at all the public announcement modalities occuring in ϕ(θ). Using the reduction axioms for public announcement logic, we can push these modalities inside, past all the other components of the necessity form. To push them past the knowledge operators K a , we use the reduction axiom 'announcement and knowledge':
To push them past implications, we use the axioms 'announcement and negation' and 'announcement and conjunction'. So now all the announcement modalities are 'stacked' on the bottom of the necessity form, right in front of θ. We repeatedly apply the axiom annnouncement composition
so that we can collapse all these announcement modalities into one announcement modality. We now take care of epistemic modalities. So far, what is left of the necessity form ϕ(θ) is a sequence of symbols of the forms (ϕ → . . . or K a . . . , followed by, at the bottom ('at right'), [χ]θ. We do not yet have the desired form 'ψ → [χ]θ' because, for example, the right-hand side of the status quo of our efforts may look like . . . K a [χ]θ. First we get rid of all K a -modalities in that sort of position: we push all the implication symbols → past all the K a -modalities by using that in the axiomatization S5 theorems of form ϕ → K a ψ can be transformed into theorems of formK a ϕ → ψ, and vice versa. From left to right: apply monotonicity ofK a to both sides of ϕ → K a ψ, getting the theoremK a ϕ →K a K a ψ. In S5,K a K a ψ is equivalent to K a ψ, so we getK a ϕ → K a ψ. Using veracity for K a , we getK a ϕ → ψ. From right to left is similar, except that we now first derive K aKa ϕ → K a ψ fromK a ϕ → ψ. In this way, we iteratively remove all K a -modalities in wrong position.
Finally, we take care of implications. We now have a theorem of the form (
. By a number of propositional steps this gives us a theorem of form ψ → [χ]θ, as desired.
Clearly, the argument works both ways, as all axioms applied are equivalences.
Proposition 34 (APAL 1 = APAL) Every APAL 1 theorem is an APAL theorem, and vice versa.
Proof Suppose we have a derivation involving an application of R 1 ( ), such that given some ϕ([p]ψ), we infer ϕ( ψ). We can now transform this into a derivation with an application of R( ). Apply Lemma 33 to ϕ( Finally, we show that every APAL ω theorem is a APAL 1 theorem.
Proposition 35 (APAL
Proof Let us observe that the rule R 1 ( ) is stronger than the rule R ω ( ): if we can prove ϕ([θ]ψ) for all epistemic formulas θ then we can prove in particular ϕ([p]ψ) for some atom p ∈ P ϕ ∪ P ψ . As a result, we can derive the conclusion of the infinitary rule using only the finitary rule R 1 ( ), and the axiomatization based on the infinitary rule R ω ( ) defines a set of theorems that is included in or equal to the set of theorems for the axiomatization based on the finitary rule R 1 ( ).
Completeness of the axiomatization APAL
ω Let us now demonstrate that the axiomatization based on the infinitary rule R ω ( ) is complete with respect to the semantics. We use Goldblatt's technique applying necessity forms, where the main effect of rule R ω ( ) is that it makes the canonical model (consisting of all maximal consistent sets of formulas closed under the rule) standard for .
A set x of formulas is called a theory if it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains the set of all theorems;
• x is closed under the rule of modus ponens and the rule R ω ( ).
Obviously, the least theory is the set of all theorems whereas the greatest theory is the set of all formulas. The latter theory is called the trivial theory. A theory x is said to be consistent if ⊥ ∈ x. Let us remark that the only inconsistent theory is the set of all formulas. We shall say that a theory x is maximal if for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x. Let x be a set of formulas. For all formulas ϕ, let x + ϕ = {ψ | ϕ → ψ ∈ x}. For all agents a, let
Lemma 36 Let x be a theory, ϕ be a formula, and a be an agent. Then x + ϕ, K a x and [ϕ]x are theories. Moreover x + ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Proof We will only prove that K a x is a theory. First, let us prove that K a x contains the set of all theorems. Let ψ be a theorem. By the necessitation of knowledge, K a ψ is also a theorem. Since x is a theory, then K a ψ ∈ x. Therefore, ψ ∈ K a x. It follows that K a x contains the set of all theorems. Second, let us prove that K a x is closed under modus ponens. Let ψ, χ be formulas such that ψ ∈ K a x and ψ → χ ∈ K a x. Thus, K a ψ ∈ x and
is a theorem and x is a theory, then
Since x is closed under modus ponens, then K a χ ∈ x. Hence, χ ∈ K a x. It follows that K a x is closed under modus ponens. Third, let us prove that K a x is closed under R ω ( ). Let ϕ be a necessity form and ψ be a formula such that
Lemma 37 (Lindenbaum lemma) Let x be a consistent theory. There exists a maximal consistent theory y such that x ⊆ y.
Proof Let ψ 0 , ψ 0 , . . . be a list of the set of all formulas. We define a sequence y 0 , y 1 , . . . of consistent theories as follows. First, let y 0 = x. Second, suppose that, for some n ≥ 0, y n is a consistent theory containing x that has been already defined. If y n + ψ n is inconsistent and y n + ¬ψ n is inconsistent then, by lemma 36, ¬ψ n ∈ y n and ¬¬ψ n ∈ y n . Since ¬ψ n → (¬¬ψ n → ⊥) is a theorem, then ¬ψ n → (¬¬ψ n → ⊥) ∈ y n . Since y n is closed under modus ponens, then ⊥ ∈ y n : a contradiction. Hence, either y n + ψ n is consistent or y n + ¬ψ n is consistent. If y n + ψ n is consistent then we define y n+1 = y n + ψ n . Otherwise, ¬ψ n ∈ y n and we consider two cases:
In the first case, we suppose that ψ n is not a conclusion of R ω ( ). Then, we define y n+1 = y n .
In the second case, we suppose that ψ n is a conclusion of R ω ( ). Let ϕ 1 ( χ 1 ), . . ., ϕ k ( χ k ) be all the representations of ψ n as a conclusion of R ω ( ). We define the sequence y 0 n , . . . , y k n of consistent theories as follows. First, let y 0 n = y n . Second, suppose that, for some i < k, y i n is a consistent theory containing y n that has been already defined. Then it contains ¬ϕ i ( χ i ). Since y i n is closed under R ω ( ), then there exists a formula ϕ i ∈ L el such that
. Now, we put y n+1 = y k n . Finally, we define y = y 0 ∪y 1 ∪. . .. It is straightforward to prove that y is a maximal consistent theory such that x ⊆ y.
The canonical model of L apal is the structure M c = (W, ∼, V ) defined as follows:
• W is the set of all maximal consistent theories; 
Further proof theoretical observations
We wish to emphasize the rather peculiar nature of this completeness proof. Given a logic APAL, a finitary axiomatization APAL, and an infinitary version APAL ω of that axiomatization with the infinitary rule R ω ( ), we have been proceeding as follows. First, we showed that every theorem of APAL is a validity of APAL (soundness). Then we showed that every validity of APAL is derivable in APAL ω by a canonical model argument (completeness). Finally we observed that every theorem of APAL ω is also derivable in APAL, by two observations. Firstly, an application of R ω ( ) can be adjusted to an application of R 1 ( ): instead of deriving the conclusion with unique occurrence ψ from an infinite set (namely for all epistemic formulas ϕ) of premises [ϕ]ψ, we pick out a premise with a fresh atom among that infinity and derive the conclusion from [ϕ]ψ only. Secondly, the other observation is that we can transform derivations with R 1 ( ) applications into derivations with R( ) applications.
The crucial aspect is that the canonical model is for the infinitary version APAL ω of the proof system, and not for the finitary proof system APAL. The infinitary version is strongly complete: from Lemma 37 and Lemma 38 follows that every consistent theory is satisfied in a model, one of the formulations of strong completeness. But this does not imply compactness, because the proof system is not finitary.
The finitary proof system APAL is only weakly complete: when proving theorems, or in other words proofs without premisses, applications of the infinitary rule R ω ( ) can be replaced by applications of the finitary rule R( ), and that proof can then be transformed to one using the finitary rule in APAL. But in infinitary proofs, starting from infinitely many assumptions, we cannot use this trick without getting rid of our proof assumptions. So strong completeness cannot be shown for the finitary axiomatization APAL, and indeed, as we have seen in Proposition 21, APAL is not compact.
Arbitrary events
Along a common line in dynamic epistemics, one might consider more general accessibility relations on our structures (as summarily explored in Proposition 20), and one might expand the language with additional modal operators, in particular: with common knowledge, with actions that are not public (such as private announcements), and with assignments (actions that change the truth value of atomic propositions). Let us consider 'arbitrary events' in the sense of arbitrary action models [5] .
In public announcement logic all events are public. More complex dynamics is also conceivable, such as private messages, events involving partial observation, etc. Action models formalize such more complex dynamics. These were proposed by Baltag et al. in [5] . We refrain from giving sufficient technical details to understand how these action models work for a reader who has not come across them before, and merely mention that an action model is a structure exactly as a Kripke model except that elements of the domain are called 'events' u instead of 'states' s, and that instead of a valuation V , that for each state determines which facts are true and false, we now have a precondition function pre, that to each event assigns a formula called a precondition. This formula is the precondition for the execution of that event. A singleton action model with universal access for all agents corresponds to a public announcement, and the precondition for the event 'public announcement' is the announcement formula.
Let U be a finite action model. Some possible generalizations are as follows ( * is arbitrary finite iteration). A sensible restriction in the semantics for arbitrary actions is that all preconditions must be epistemic formulas.
iff there is a U of a given signature :
In the first two proposals a given action model U is a parameter of the language. The first was investigated by Hoshi in [16, p.8] . The second can be seen as a generalization of iterated relativization which was investigated in [19] , and it results in undecidable logics. In the third we allow action models of a given signature, i.e. an action model frame without preconditions for action point execution. The logic APAL comes under this category: it is arbitrary event logic for the signature 'singleton': this sort of action model corresponds to an announcement. The last proposal seems the endpoint of further generalization. From a multi-agent perspective, where more complex than public events are conceivable, this also seems the most obvious perspective for multi-agent knowability. Note that action model logic (without ) is again equally expressive as multi-agent logic. All validities in Proposition 7 hold, and we conjecture that CR also holds. Axiom MK does not hold. Even in finite models there are infinite chains of informative actions, because the uncertainty of agents about each other's uncertainty can be arbitrarily complex. An example is, given initial uncertainty of two agents a, b about the value of an atom p, that a privately learns that p, after which b privately learns that a privately learnt that p, after which a privately learns that, and so on, thus creating an arbitrarily large finite model satifying K a K b K a K b . . . p but where b does not know that. Proposition 12 stating that the truth of ♦ψ can always be simulated by the truth of p ψ for some fresh atom p, has a natural generalization to replacing formula preconditions in action models by fresh atoms. In the axiomatization APAL (Table 2) we have to add the various axioms reducing the postconditions of updates, and we have to replace the axiom 'announcement and knowledge' by its action-model-reducing counterpart ϕ → [U ]ϕ where for all events u ∈ U : pre(u) ∈ L el arbitrary and specific event Unfortunately, it is unclear what derivation rule should allow the introduction of a -formula;
an inference involving announcement of a fresh atomic variable is certainly not good enough: this atom only 'witnesses' a public announcement, and not other action models. If factual change is also permitted, one has the peculiar result that ♦ϕ is valid for all consistent ϕ, in other words, all satisfiable formulas are realizable (reachable) in any information state (subject to the restriction that the information state is finite). This applies a technical result in van Ditmarsch and Kooi [30] : given two finite information states, there is an event transforming the first into the second. Allowing factual change seems a too drastic departure from the original Fitch question what true formulas are knowable: that seems to suggest that only informative actions are allowed to get to know things, but not factual change.
Conclusions and further research
We proposed an extension of public announcement logic with a dynamic modal operator ϕ expressing that ϕ is true after every announcement ψ. We gave various semantic results, defined fragments of 'knowable' formulas in the Fitch sense that |= ϕ → ♦K a ϕ, and we showed completeness for a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic.
We anticipate a number of further investigations, by us or others. More details on model checking and decidability would be relevant-in particular the somewhat surprising undecidability result. We eagerly look forward to the validation and publication of French' results in [11] .
Results on model checking and decidability are also relevant for the 'grander scheme' comparing dynamic epistemic logics and temporal epistemic logics, as in recent work by van Benthem et al. [28] , and in work in progress by Hoshi [17] . In the comparison between temporal with dynamic epistemics, if we let an announcement correspond to a tick of the clock, a dynamic announcement operator [ϕ] therefore corresponds to a temporal 'next' operator, and our arbitrary announcement operator ♦ then corresponds to the temporal future operator F , for 'some time in the future'.
Given the proved validities for , a relevant question seems where in the S4 scheme of logics the logic APAL resides. It is not S5, but at least (given CR and MK) S4.1 and S4.2. Unfortunately it is unclear whether is a a normal modal operator, more concretely: whether the validities in L ∩ APAL satisfy uniform substitution. Tentative evidence against it, is that public announcement logic is not normal, e.g. [p]p is valid but [p ∧ ¬Kp]p ∧ ¬Kp is invalid. Further tentative evidence against normality is that an interpretation of in terms of neighbourhood semantics is conceivable [2] ; which points to non-normality. On the other hand, arbitrary announcement logic with but without announcements might just as well be equally expressive as APAL. This is the logic with language ϕ ::= p|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|K a ϕ| ϕ and with -semantics: M, s |= ϕ iff for all ψ ∈ L el : M, s |= ψ implies M |ψ, s |= ϕ. If so, that would be suggestive evidence for normality of .
Because of these uncertainties about the character of it is sometimes difficult to interpret our results. For example, the principle MK ( ♦ϕ → ♦ ϕ) in conjunction with 4 ( ϕ → ϕ) correspond to the frame property of atomicity, defined as ∀x∃y(Rxy∧∀z(Ryz → z = y)) (see [6, p.167, Ex.3 .57]). In our terms, atomicity seems to describe that one can always make a most informative announcement. But this is false! Consider the model consisting of 2 |P | states namely one for each valuation of atomic propositions; and with universal access on the domain for all agents. Every given epistemic formula contains only a finite number of atoms, so after its announcement a further informative announcement remains possible. So a most informative announcement can not always be made. This puzzles us.
Our -operator is an implicit quantification over announcements. Of course, one can also make the quantification explicit. In other words, instead of ♦ϕ we may as well write ∃ψ ψ ϕ. This approach is currently investigated by Baltag.
Unlike public announcement logic, arbitrary announcement logic can also be used to specify planning problems, as in AI: we can express some initial knowledge conditions, and a final desideratum in terms of knowledge, and a diamond ♦ of unknown instantiation representing a sequence of announcements supposedly realizing it. In other words, something of the form init → ♦Kfinal. Different variants of this theme are conceivable. If our logic 'works', we can reduce and manipulate such an expression so that it should ultimately deliver the concrete announcements needed to realize the final knowledge conditions: a plan. We did not pursue this matter although a tableaux calculus for APAL may be relevant to mention here [4] .
